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MAINTAINING RESALE PRICE THROUGH RE-
FUSALS TO DEAL: A RE-EXAMINATION
JOHN J. HANSON *
Some manufacturers, for a variety of reasons, have from time
immemorial desired to control the resale prices of their products.
However, an agreement between the manufacturer and a retailer
setting forth the price at which the retailer will resell the manu-
factured product has long been held to be illegal under the antitrust
laws.'
The manufacturer, however, has two possible ways of achieving
the objective of controlling resale prices. One method is to comply
with the pertinent state fair trade laws, and come within the exemp-
tions from the antitrust laws set forth in the Miller-Tydings Ace
and the McGuire Act. 3
* A.B. 1948, University of Denver; LL.B. 1951, Harvard University; associated
with the firm of Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, Los Angeles. The author wishes to
acknowledge the assistance of Irwin F. Woodland of the same firm in the preparation
of this article.
1
 This type of price control has usually been referred to as "vertical price fixing"
as distinguished from "horizontal price fixing" where two or more competitors agree
on the price at which each of them will sell his product. Horizontal price fixing clearly
violates § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952); United
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), Trenton Potteries Co. v. United
States, 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Vertical price fixing was held to be illegal under the
Sherman Act as early as 1911 in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,
220 U.S. 370 (1911).
§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)
(1952), prohibits "unfair methods of competition." The Supreme Court of the United
States has held on several occasions that any activity violating § 1 of the Sherman Act
also violates § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Fashion Originators' Guild v.
F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
Thus, in the absence of one of the exemptions discussed below, a clear-cut under-
standing between a manufacturer and a retailer as to the price at which the retailer
will sell is illegal, both under the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
2 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
3 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1952). The Miller-Tydings Act, passed
in 1937, was an amendment to § 1 of the Sherman Act providing in general that fair
trade contracts (or vertical price fixing arrangements), legal under state law, were
exempt from the federal antitrust laws. The usual state fair trade acts provided that an
agreement between a manufacturer and retailer fixing the prices at which the retailer
would sell, was not illegal under state law, and further that it was unfair competition
for any other retailer, with notice of the existence of the agreement, to sell below the
price specified in the fair trade contract. The retailers bound by notice of the contract
have traditionally been referred to as "non-signers." The United States Supreme Court
in the case of Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), held
that the exemption created by the Miller-Tydings Act was not as broad as the state fair
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The second method of controlling prices is based on the Colgate
doctrine established by the Supreme Court in 1919. The substance
of the Colgate doctrine is that a manufacturer has the right to specify
resale prices, announce in advance that he will refuse to sell to
customers who fail to maintain the specified prices, and in fact refuse
to sell to such customers if the latter fail to comply. In addition, as
set forth below, the cases have permitted a manufacturer to engage in
other activities in connection with specified prices, as long as no
understanding was reached as to price maintenance.
The Colgate doctrine has had a stormy history and, as discussed
below, has been limited by subsequent cases. The Supreme Court in
the last term again refused to apply the Colgate doctrine in United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co!
II
The Colgate case involved the sufficiency of an indictment charg-
ing defendant manufacturer with a violation of the Sherman Act for
an unlawful combination with wholesale and retail dealers for the
purpose and with the effect of procuring adherence by the dealers to
the resale prices suggested by defendant.
The District Court (E.D. Va.) interpreted the indictment as fail-
ing to allege any contract or agreement between the manufacturer and
dealers to bind themselves to maintain resale prices. Accepting this
interpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's ruling
sustaining the demurrer to the indictment with these words:
"And we must conclude that, as interpreted below, the in-
dictment does not charge Colgate & Company with selling its
products to dealers under agreements, which obligated the
latter not to resell except at prices fixed by the company. .
the act does not restrict the long-recognized right of trader
trade laws. Specifically, it held that the Miller-Tydings Act did not make vertical price
fixing arrangements legal insofar as "non-signers" were concerned.
Shortly after the Schwegmann decision Congress enacted the McGuire Act as an
amendment to § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The McGuire Act in sub-
stance exempted from the federal antitrust laws fair trade agreements including their
applicability to "non-signers."
Although some forty-five states have enacted fair trade statutes, a number of
the statutes have been held violative of state constitutions, some being held unconsti-
tutional insofar as the non-signer provision is concerned.
In addition, the fair trade exemption of the McGuire Act is not applicable to
any type of horizontal arrangement. For example, if a manufacturer has a fair trade
contract with a retailer and the manufacturer also acts as a retailer, the agreement is
not within the exemption because this agreement is in effect a "horizontal agreement"
between two retailers. United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
4 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
5 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
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or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties
with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in
advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to
sell." [Emphasis addec1.] 8
It would appear, therefore, that under Colgate, in view of the
above statement and the other allegation in the indictment, the manu-
facturer could not only announce in advance the terms upon which it
would deal and refuse to deal with non-adhering customers, but it
could, in addition to unilaterally refusing to deal, do the following to
effectuate its policy of resale price maintenance:
(1) Urge customers to adhere to such prices,
(2) Request customers to furnish information about price cutters,
(3) Investigate activities of price cutters,
(4) Place the names of price cutters on "suspended lists,"
(5) Request and receive promises from price cutters of future
adherence to resale prices and refuse to deal with any price cutter
who did not give assurances.
It can readily be seen from the above that the actions of the
Colgate Company amounted to more than a mere refusal to deal. If
a refusal to deal is taken as the starting point of permissive behavior
under the Acts, the question then becomes: "What other activities
by the manufacturer when added to the refusal to deal will bring the
entire course of conduct across the line of illegality?"
In the cases which followed Colgate, many such activities were
permitted.'
6 Supra note 4, at 306-07.
7 Judicially recognized permissible activities have included the receipt of assurances
from price cutters that they would adhere to fixed prices in the future, the mailing of
form letters to price cutters insisting upon the upholding of retail prices, the requests to
customers for information on price cutting activities by other customers, and the
investigation of price cutting through company salesmen. Such activities were upheld
in Harriet Hubbard Ayer, Inc. v. F.T.C., 15 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. den., 273
U.S. 759 (1927).
A suggestion by a manufacturer to wholesalers that if the jobbers fixed resale
prices the manufacturer would refuse to sell to anyone who did not adhere to such
fixed prices, and investigation and refusal to sell to offending wholesale dealers were
likewise held permissible activities under the Colgate doctrine in American Tobacco
Co. v. F.T.C., 9 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 543 (1927).
In the case of Toledo Pipe Threading Mach. Co. v. F.T.C., 11 F.2d 337 (6th Cir.
1926), although a violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act was found, the Com-
mission order prohibiting the manufacturer from utilizing the following price control
methods was reversed: (1) manifesting to dealers an intent to act on all reports of price
cutting by refusal to deal with any price cutter; (2) informing dealers that unless
price cutters gave assurances of adherence, they would be refused further sales; (3) em-
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While the Federal Courts were thus staking out the path which
the Colgate case defined, the Supreme Court, just three years after the
decision in Colgate, decided the Beech-Nut case.8 Although this case
was decided under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
a violation of that section is also, as has been noted, a violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act') In the Beech-Nut case and those
following it, the courts attempted to spell out the conduct which, in
addition to a refusal to deal, would constitute a violation of either
the Sherman or Federal Trade Commission Acts.
As in Colgate, there was no agreement, as such, between the
manufacturer and the dealers. However, in the Beech-Nut case, the
defendant attempted to enforce a resale-price policy by a compre-
hensive plan of supervision at all levels of distribution."
In reviewing the activities of Beech-Nut Company the court said:
".. .. The facts found show that the Beech-Nut system goes
far beyond the simple refusal to sell goods to persons who
will not sell at stated prices, which, in the Colgate case, was
held to be within the legal right of the producer. [Emphasis
added.]
"The system here disclosed necessarily constitutes a
scheme which restrains the natural flow of commerce and the
freedom of competition in the channels of interstate trade
which it has been the purpose of all the antitrust acts to
maintain. In its practical operation it necessarily constrains
the trader, if he would have the products of the Beech-Nut
Company, to maintain the prices 'suggested' by it. If he
fails so to do, he is subject to be reported to the company,
either by special agents, numerous and active in that behalf,
or by dealers whose aid is enlisted in maintaining the system
and the prices fixed by it. Furthermore, he is enrolled upon
a list known as 'Undesirable—Price Cutters,' to whom goods
ploying its salesmen to investigate charges of price cutting reported by dealers and
advising dealers of that fact.
8 F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
9 Fashion Originators' Guild v. F.T.C., supra note 1.
to Among the steps taken by Beech-Nut to insure price maintenance were: (1)
using its agents, distributors and customers to report price cutting dealers; (2) placing
price cutting dealers on lists of undesirable purchasers who were not to be supplied
until they gave satisfactory assurances of their intent to maintain resale prices; (3)
employing agents to report price cutters and giving orders of purchase only to non-
price cutting jobbers; (4) utilizing symbols to ascertain the names of price cutting
dealers or those who sold to price cutters in order to prevent price cutters from obtain-
ing the company's products; (5) utilizing other cooperative means of accomplishing price
maintenance.
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are not to be sold, and who are only to be reinstated as one
whose record is 'clear,' and to whom sales may be made, up-
on his giving satisfactory assurance that he will not resell
the goods of the company except at the prices suggested
by it, and will refuse to sell to distributors who do not main-
tain such prices.
"From this course of conduct a court may infer, indeed,
cannot escape the conclusion, that competition among retail
distributors is practically suppressed, for all who would deal
in the company's products are constrained to sell at the sug-
gested prices.""
The Colgate decision, it will be remembered, rested upon the
absence of an averment of any agreement. In Beech-Nut, this hurdle
was readily overcome, the court saying:
iC
.... Nor is the inference overcome by the conclusion stated
in the commission's findings that the merchandising conduct
of the company does not constitute a contract or contracts
whereby resale prices are fixed, maintained, or enforced.
The specific facts found show suppression of the freedom
of competition by methods in which the company secures the
cooperation of its distributors and customers, which are quite
as effectual as agreements, express or implied, intended to
accomplish the same purpose. By these methods the com-
pany, although selling its products at prices satisfactory to
it, is enabled to prevent competition in their subsequent dis-
position by preventing all who do not sell at resale prices
fixed by it from obtaining its goods." [Emphasis added.] 12
After the Beech-Nut decision, we thus had two separate stand-
ards. On the one hand, there was Colgate which permitted, absent
an agreement, a refusal to sell plus what might be termed other non-
coercive price-maintenance activities. On the other hand, Beech-Nut
said there was no need to find an agreement so long as the methods
used were as effectual as agreements.
Beech-Nut has long been looked upon as a decision limiting the
Colgate holding. In subsequent criminal and civil cases we find the
manufacturer invariably attempting to justify his activities in reliance
on Colgate only to be struck down by the application of Beech-Nut
standards."
F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., supra note 8, at 454-455.
12 Id. at 455.
13 See e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co , 321 U.S. 707 (1944) ;
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III
As previously discussed, the fundamental reason for the finding
that the activities of the Colgate Company were not in violation of
the Sherman Act was that no averment of any contract or agreement
whereby the defendant and his customers bound themselves to en-
hance and maintain prices was included in the indictinent. In other
words, the absence of any "agreement" was held fatal to an indict-
ment under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In addition, the court in
Colgate went on to state that the Sherman Act does not restrict the
long recognized right of one engaged in an entirely private business
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to those parties
with whom he will deal.
Although the Colgate doctrine has been limited through judicial
interpretation, from Beech-Nut on, it has never been expressly over-
ruled, and, despite the urgings of judges and commentators,'' has con-
tinued to be a basic antitrust principle.
A recent Supreme Court case which has perhaps further confined
the permissive area of retail price maintenance is that of United States
v. Parke, Davis & Company.' 5
 In this case as in Colgate, there was
no finding of any express or implied agreement between Parke, Davis
and its customers to maintain suggested prices. Nevertheless, the
government sought an injunction alleging that Parke, Davis conspired
and combined with retail and wholesale druggists to maintain whole-
sale and retail prices of its pharmaceutical products.
Parke, Davis sold its products through wholesalers as well as
directly to large retailers. Separate catalogues were published, each
of which listed suggested retail prices. When some retailers began
to cut prices, Parke, Davis instituted a program to maintain the
suggested prices.
Wholesalers were told not to sell to price-cutting retailers and
simultaneously retailers were told they would not be able to buy the
company's products, either directly or through wholesalers, if they
cut prices. Each wholesaler and retailer was informed that all others
were being contacted, and recalcitrant retailers were to be cut off.
Armand Co. v. F.T.C., 78 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Moir v. F.T.C., 12 F.2d 22 (1st
Cir. 1926); Hills Bros. v. F.T.C., 9 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Cream of Wheat Co. v.
F.T.C., 14 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1926).
14 See Judge Frank's dissent in Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing
Co., 189 F.2d 913, 917 and Note, 58 Yale L.J. 1121 (1949).
15
 Supra note 5. The case in the Supreme Court was a civil case. The government
also brought criminal proceedings which Parke, Davis successfully defended in the
District Court, United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. 1957 Trade Cas. 11 68,856 (D.D.C.
(1957).
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There was a good deal of evidence showing that the company's
representatives visited some dealers, at the request of others, to obtain
adherence to the program. There was also much reporting back to
complaining dealers in an attempt to secure unanimity. Efforts were
also directed at preventing cut-price advertising of Parke, Davis
products by dealers. •
The District Court, in the words of Justice Brennan, "apparently
assumed that the Government could prevail only by establishing a
contractual arrangement, albeit implied, between Parke, Davis and
its customers.i 1° Citing Bausch & Lomb and Beech-Nut, the Supreme
Court declared this to be an erroneous interpretation of the applicable
standard in that "both cases teach that a judicial inquiry is not to
stop with a search of the record for evidence of purely contractual
arrangements.'"T The court then set out the standard to be applied:
"Thus, whether an unlawful combination or conspiracy is proved is to
be judged by what the parties actually did rather than by the words
they used."'
The specific statutory violation was described as follows:
"In thus involving the wholesalers to stop the flow of Parke,
Davis products to the retailers, thereby inducing retailers'
adherence to its suggested retail prices, Parke, Davis created
a combination with the retailers and the wholesalers to main-
tain retail prices and violated the Sherman Act." [Emphasis
added.] 19
An additional violation was found in the manner in which prices
were controlled in the direct dealer relationship. By using the acqui-
escence of others, substantial unanimity was brought about among
competitors. Because the resulting concerted action (of the retailers)
was induced by the manufacturer, the Sherman Act was violated in
that a price-maintenance combination or conspiracy was effected.
Two types of behavior, therefore, must now be found to constitute
statutory violations. Where a manufacturer seeking to maintain a
resale price policy at the retail level sells his products through whole-
salers, he may not "conspire or combine" with them for the purpose
of cutting off access to the wholesalers by retailers who fail to ob-
serve the retail price policy.
Since many products, which might properly be classified as con-
1e United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 5, at 43; but see dissenting
opinion at 53-54.
1.1 Id. at 44.
18 Ibid.
19 Id. at 45.
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sumer items, are sold through wholesalers and jobbers before reach-
ing the retailer, it is difficult to see in the light of this decision how a
manufacturer who chooses this route of distribution can enforce a
retail price policy.
A manufacturer can still apparently rely on the Colgate doctrine
when he is dealing directly with retailers. The caveat here must be
that a refusal to sell, which may be announced to all retailers, must
only be enforced against the offending retailer. Any attempt at co-
ordinating the resale activities of the retailers in an effort to lessen
competition may be a violation.
After the decision of the Supreme Court in Parke, Davis, the
Second Circuit decided Warner & Company v. Black & Decker
Manufacturing Co.,' a case in which treble damages were sought
under the Sherman Act.
Warner was a wholesale distributor of Black & Decker tools to
the trade and to government agencies. Black & Decker ordered its
distributors, when bidding on government orders, to adhere to prices
fixed by it. Warner submitted a successful low bid for Black & Decker
tools to the New York City Housing Authority. The bid was not in
conformity with the company's pricing plan. Warner was warned
that unless he withdrew his bid, or revised it to meet the price stand-
ards, its distributorship would be terminated. When Warner did not
change its bid, Black & Decker carried out its threat.
The action was dismissed in the District Court (Eastern District,
N.Y.) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The Court of Appeals for the 2d Circuit reversed, finding a meritorious
claim had been alleged sufficient to warrant a trial on the merits.
Since the appeal was based on the sustaining of what was essen-
tially a general demurrer, the case may not be a valuable precedent
in the price-fixing field. ft is important, however, to note that when
the cause was pleaded in the District Court, on an amended com-
plaint, the Parke, Davis case had not been decided. The District
Court used the following language:
"To answer that question, [whether the complaint was
adequate to charge a conspiracy] it is necessary to remem-
ber that the essence of a conspiracy is an agreement, which
means that two or more persons—however informal the
medium may be—agree to do or refrain from doing one or
more things. A conspiracy may embrace an illegal object,
or a legal purpose illegally to be effected, but the fundamen-
20 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
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tal requirement is none the less to be averred, in order that
issue may be joined for the purpose of trial.
"The amended complaint is replete with alleged evi-
dence, but is deficient in failing to contain the essential alle-
gation of agreement or contract, without which no cause can
be deemed to have been stated." [Emphasis and parenthet-
ical material added.] 21
It will be seen, therefore, that the District Court in Warner took
the same position as the District Court in Parke, Davis.
The Court of Appeals, however, in Warner found the allegations
[even in the absence of an allegation of conspiracy] were sufficient
to bring the amended complaint within the doctrine of the Beech-Nut
and the recent Parke, Davis decisions.
To support its holding, the Court of Appeals, referring to the
extremely broad language of Parke, Davis, stated:
"The court indicated that when the manufacturer's actions
`go beyond mere announcement of his policy and the simple
refusal to deal, and he employs other means which effect ad-
herence to his resale prices,' then he has put together a com-
bination in violation of the Sherman Act."'
In the case of Becken Company v. Gemex Corporation," we
find what at first glance would appear to be a simple case of refusal
to deal, permissible under the Colgate doctrine. In Becken, the manu-
facturer did not attempt to fix the price to the ultimate consumer,
but merely tried to control the price at which his wholesalers would
sell to the trade.
Gemex is a manufacturer of watchbands and Becken a distribu-
tor. There were at least two other distributors working in the same
area as Becken. It apparently was the policy of the manufacturer
not only to require its distributors to sell Gemex products at sug-
gested prices but also to require the sale of competing lines at prices
suggested by the competing manufacturers.
Becken would not agree to this arrangement, although told by
Gemex that his competitors had already expressed willingness to go
along. Upon Becken's refusal, he was dropped as a distributor of the
Gemex line.
The District Court (Northern District, Ill.) dismissed the action
21- Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 172 F. Supp, 221, 225 (ED. N.Y.
1959).
22 Warner v. Black & Decker, supra note 20, at 790.
23 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959).
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with prejudice. However, the Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit
found a plan of operation, the essential purpose of which was to limit
the sale of the manufacturer's products to wholesalers who would
agree not to sell below prices stipulated by defendant. Such an agree-
ment because of its involvement of the two other distributors violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The refusal to continue plaintiff as a
wholesaler was solely because he would not sell products according
to defendant's illegal plan of doing business in violation of Section 1.
CONCLUSION
Any manufacturer who desires to control resale prices must act
carefully. The question of the means employed to do this is crucial,
for any transgression of the price-fixing laws is sure to bring some
form of legal action against him.
If he rests upon the "refusal to dear' techniques sanctioned
by the Colgate decision he must at all times be aware of the limited
amount of affirmative actions legally permitted him to secure ad-
herence to his price policies. The penalties for calculating improperly
the means to be used are many. He may become subject to prosecu-
tion by the Justice Department for a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and in addition the Federal Trade Commission may
bring proceedings under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.
Along with this threat of governmental sanctions he must also
be aware that a disgruntled retailer, who has been cut off from his
source of supply for failure to observe the pricing policies of the
manufacturer, may bring a civil suit under the Sherman Act. The
assessable damages which may result from a successful prosecution
of such a civil case place an extremely heavy burden on the unlucky
defendant, carrying as they do treble damages as well as costs and
attorneys' fees.
How then may a resale price policy be implemented?
The safest procedure is to follow carefully the route of the Fair
Trade laws in states where they are in effect and to the extent provided
by those state laws. This means of course that the status of the Fair
Trade laws in every state in which business is done must be considered
separately. Only thus can the manufacturer be assured of staying
within the exemptions to the price-fixing laws.
How long these laws will remain a haven for the sorely pressed
manufacturer is an open question. 24 The fair-trade exemption has
24 State Fair Trade Acts have been declared unconstitutional in whole or in part
in Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah,
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always been unpopular with the Justice Department and the Federal
Trade Commission, both of whom have always sought to narrow
the exemption.
In states in which there are no fair trade laws, no alternative
is left except to proceed as carefully as possible under the Colgate
doctrine. In this connection the contention of the government in the
Parke, Davis case is revealing:
"The Government contends, however, that subsequent deci-
sions of this Court compel the holding that what Parke,
Davis did here by -entwining the wholesalers and retailers
in a program to promote general compliance with its price
maintenance policy went beyond mere customer selection
and created combinations or conspiracies to enforce resale
price maintenance in violation of Sections 1 and 3 of the
Sherman Act!'" [Emphasis added.]
The position of the government is illuminating in that it probably
reveals the direction in which it will move in future prosecutions for
vertical price fixing.
As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible to secure adher-
ence to a price-maintenance policy without "entwining" the whole-
salers or retailers in the implementation of that policy.
There is always continuity on the prosecution side of an anti-
trust suit. With every prosecution the government can lay one more
brick in its wall of enforcement. The successful prosecution of a
case by the government, and adoption by the court of the govern-
ment's contentions, results in those contentions becoming the standard
for future prosecutions. Such a test as "entwining" makes the per-
missible area of vertical price maintenance ever more narrow.
The Supreme Court in Parke, Davis in refusing to overrule the
Colgate case, stated:
. . . 
The Sherman Act forbids combinations of traders to
suppress competition. True, there results the same economic
effect as is accomplished by a prohibited combination to sup-
press price competition if each customer, although induced
to do so solely by a manufacturer's announced policy, in-
dependently decides to observe specified resale prices. So
long as Colgate is not overruled, this result is tolerated but
only when it is the consequence of a mere refusal to sell
in the exercise of the manufacturer's right 'freely to exer-
Washington and West Virginia. See 1 Trade Reg. Rep. 1 . 3003 (1960). Most of the
cases involve only the non-signer provision.
25 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra note 5, at 37-3,?.
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cise his own independent discretion as to the parties with
whom he will deal.' "20
 [Emphasis added.]
Where a manufacturer distributes exclusively through whole-
salers or jobbers, his "discretion as to the parties with whom he will
deal" would not extend to the retailers. To effectuate a retail price-
maintenance policy at the retail level, the cooperation of the inter-
mediate wholesale level would be essential. It is almost impossible to
outline a method of cooperation which would not come within the
"entwining" contention of the government in Parke, Davis.
On the other hand, the manufacturer who deals directly with his
retailers might be able to control resale prices through the use of the
Colgate doctrine. To him the following suggestions are made:
(1) The manufacturer may suggest resale prices to its cus-
tomers and state that it will refuse in the future to sell to customers
who do not maintain the suggested prices. The manufacturer should
also state that the customer is free to sell at whatever prices it desires.
(2) The policy statement in (1) above should be embodied in a
written document and mailed to the customer. There should be no
other communication, written or oral, with the customer regarding
prices. Employees should be advised in writing of these prohibitions
and the manufacturer should see that no such discussions take place.
(3) In the event a customer fails to maintain the suggested
prices, the manufacturer may refuse to sell to him in the future.
(4) The manufacturer should do no act other than sending out
the written policy statement and refusing to sell in the event of non-
compliance. Any other activity will raise serious legal problems.
There is, of course, no assurance that even the above described
program will not be challenged as illegal. Under such challenge the
Colgate case may be overruled, in which event the above program
could be held illegal if substantial price uniformity resulted.
The practical difficulty with the recommended program is that
it is unlikely that it could be limited as set forth. Almost inevitably,
it seems, some representative of the manufacturer, either orally or in
writing, will take some action to secure adherence to the suggested
prices. As Judge Moore of the 2d Circuit stated in the Warner case
in reference to the Colgate doctrine:
"The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through
which a manufacturer may pass, even though the facts would
have to be of such Doric simplicity as to be somewhat rare
in this day of complex business enterprise." 27
26 Id. at 44.
27 Warner v. Black & Decker, supra note 20, at 790.
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